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Abstract: We offer a new argument for the claim that there can be non-degenerate 
objective chance in a deterministic world. Using a formal model of the relationship 
between different levels of description of a system, we show how objective chance at a 
higher level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for 
the level-specificity of chance, our argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level 
chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties 
supervening on lower-level ones. We show that the distinction between objective chance 
and epistemic probability can be drawn, and operationalized, at every level of description. 
There is, therefore, not a single distinction between objective and epistemic probability, 
but a family of such distinctions. 
1. Introduction 
There has been much debate on whether there can be objective chance in a deterministic 
world. The “orthodox view” is that non-degenerate objective chance (“true randomness”) 
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is incompatible with determinism, and that any use of probability in a deterministic world 
is purely epistemic, reflecting nothing but an observer’s lack of complete information. 
This view was held by Popper (1982) and Lewis (1986) and has recently been defended 
by Schaffer (2007). Other authors defend “compatibilist views”, according to which there 
can be non-degenerate objective chance in a deterministic world (e.g., Hoefer 2007, 
Ismael 2009, Sober 2010, Glynn 2010). They employ a variety of argumentative strategies, 
ranging from an appeal to statistical mechanics (e.g., von Plato 1982, Loewer 2001, Frigg 
and Hoefer 2010) to a semantic approach linking chance to ability (Eagle 2010).  
One strategy is to argue that the objective chance of an event depends on the level 
of description (e.g., Loewer 2001, Glynn 2010, Strevens 2011). According to this 
strategy, saying that, macroscopically described, a coin toss has an objective chance of ½ 
of landing heads is consistent with saying that, microscopically described, the initial state 
of the coin determines the outcome. Furthermore, as Glynn (2010) argues, such level-
specific chances can play the role we expect “objective chance” to play. However, no 
existing version of this strategy has been sufficiently immunized against the objection 
that so-called “higher-level chances” are best understood, not as true objective chances, 
but as expressing the observer’s uncertain degrees of belief about the events in question, 
given his (or her) informational limitations.1 
We develop an account of objective chance as an emergent phenomenon that 
answers this objection. Our account is based on a formal model of the relationship 
                                                
1 Another view, defended by Lyon (2011), is that higher-level probabilities, such as those 
we find in classical statistical mechanics or evolutionary theory, are neither objective 
chances nor credences, but counterfactual probabilities, whose primary role is to convey 
certain counterfactual information in explanations. 
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between different levels of description of a system (drawing on List 2014 and Butterfield 
2012) and shows how indeterminism and chance at a higher level can coexist with 
determinism and the absence of chance at a lower level.2 We identify a precise sense in 
which higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability and show that the 
distinction between the two can be drawn and operationalized at every level of 
description. It is therefore misleading to draw a single overall distinction between 
objective chance and epistemic probability. There is an entire family of such distinctions: 
one for each level.  
The key insight underlying our account is that different levels of description of a 
system correspond to different specifications of the system’s state space and its set of 
possible histories, at different levels of “coarse-graining”, which induce different 
“algebras of events” on which probabilities are defined. Far from overcomplicating 
matters, this insight allows us to develop a parsimonious criterion of what separates 
objective chance from epistemic probability. What we are suggesting is no doubt implicit 
in earlier work on the topic (e.g., von Plato 1982), but the literature does not yet contain a 
                                                
2 Butterfield (2012) and List (2014) discuss emergent indeterminism in different contexts, 
not the context of chance. As we were revising this paper, a new defence of level-specific 
chance by Frigg and Hoefer (2013) came to our attention, which is somewhat similar in 
spirit to ours, though without an explicit model of branching histories or level-specific 
algebras of events. Frigg and Hoefer defend a “chance-rule pluralism” according to which 
“[p]robability rules can be formulated in terms pertaining to different levels of discourse 
such as macro physics, chemistry, genetics, mechanical engineering and meteorology, 
and probability rules formulated in such terms have equal right to be considered for 
inclusion in a Best System package of rules, alongside micro-level rules” (ibid., 8). 
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satisfactory account of why the objective-epistemic distinction can be drawn at every 
level and how different levels are insulated from one another so as to permit objective 
chance as a higher-level phenomenon, despite “chancy” higher-level world histories 
supervening on “non-chancy” lower-level ones. 
2. The basic setup 
We model a system whose state evolves over time.3 Time is represented by a set T of 
points that are linearly ordered. The state of the system at each time is given by an 
element of some set S of possible states, which we call the state space. A history of the 
system is a temporal path through the state space, formally a function h from T into S, 
where, for each time t in T, h(t) is the state of the system at t.  
In this model, histories play the role of possible worlds. We write Ω to denote the 
set of all histories deemed possible. This could be either the set of all logically possible 
functions from T into S or, more plausibly, a proper subset of that universal set, so as to 
capture the fact that the laws of the system permit some histories while ruling out others. 
Possibility (in Ω) can then be understood as nomological possibility.4  
It is helpful to view the states in S as the different possible physical states that the 
system could be in, and the histories in Ω as the different possible physical histories. 
                                                
3 We use and extend a formalism that has previously been used in a different context – that 
of agency and free will – by List (2014). Structurally similar branching-history models 
include Butterfield (2012) and, in agential contexts, Belnap, Perloff, and Xu (2001). 
4 The laws of the system may go beyond specifying modal facts (facts about what is and 
is not nomologically possible); the set Ω only encodes those modal facts. A family of 
objective chance functions, when it exists, may encode additional, probabilistic facts. 
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Later, in Section 5, we introduce more “coarse-grained” sets S and Ω of “higher-level” 
states and “higher-level” histories, but S and Ω as introduced here should be understood 
as containing only states and histories at a single, “lower” level.  
To define determinism and indeterminism, some further terminology is needed. For 
any history h and any time t, we write ht to denote the truncated history up to time t 
(defined as the restriction of the function h to all points in time up to t in the relevant 
linear order). A history h is deterministic (in Ω) if, for every time t, its truncation ht has 
only one possible continuation in Ω, where a possible continuation of ht is a history h’ 
such that h’t = ht. A history h is indeterministic (in Ω) if, for some time t, its truncation ht 
has more than one possible continuation in Ω. Thus indeterministic histories allow 
branching, while deterministic histories do not. Note that a history’s property of being 
deterministic or indeterministic is defined relative to the set Ω of possible histories and 
thereby relative to the underlying laws (which induce Ω). These laws can be said to be 
deterministic if Ω contains only deterministic histories (i.e., there is never any branching), 
and indeterministic otherwise (i.e., there is sometimes branching).  
Probability functions, irrespective of their interpretation, are always defined on 
algebras of events. An event is a collection of histories, i.e., a subset of Ω. An algebra is a 
collection of events that is closed under union, intersection, and complementation. One 
example of an algebra is the set of all possible events (i.e., the power set of Ω). However, 
when Ω is infinite, it is technically useful to work with smaller algebras. Typically, the 
structure of Ω dictates a canonical choice of algebra, which we label A(Ω).5 A probability 
function is a function Pr from A(Ω) into the interval from 0 to 1 with standard properties; 
                                                
5 For example, if Ω has a topology, A(Ω) is usually the Borel sigma algebra. 
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Pr(E) denotes the probability of event E. The function is non-degenerate if some events 
have probability greater than 0 and less than 1. 
There can be different probability functions on the same algebra, indexed to 
different “locations” or “vantage points”. It is widely agreed, for example, that any 
objective chance function, when it exists, is indexed to a particular history and time 
(Lewis 1986, Schaffer 2007). To indicate this, we use the notation Prh,t. Chance 
assignments thus take the form “event E has objective chance p in history h at time t” (in 
short, Prh,t(E) = p).6 Epistemic probability (or credence) functions are indexed to agents 
and their informational states (and optionally histories and times). Assignments of 
epistemic probability (or credence) thus take the form “agent A with information I (in 
history h at time t) has degree of belief p in event E”.7 For the moment, we do not need 
any explicit notation for epistemic probability functions. 
                                                
6 An alternative approach, also consistent with our analysis, is to take conditional chance 
as basic (e.g., Hájek 2003a,b). On it, one need not explicitly define a chance function Prh,t 
for each history h and time t, but can derive it from a family of conditional probability 
functions Pr(•|•) by conditionalizing on ht (i.e., on the event {h’∈Ω : h’ is a continuation of ht}); 
for any event E, Prh,t(E) = Pr(E | ht). If we take Pr(•|•) as basic, the functions Prh,t inherit 
Bayesian restrictions (e.g., if t is after t’, Prh,t(E)=Prh,t’(E|ht)), a slight (but perhaps plausible) 
loss of generality. For analyses of chance via conditionalization on histories, see Loewer 
(2001, esp. 618), Hoefer (2007, esp. 562-565), and Glynn (2010, esp. 78-79). 
7 If one takes agent A’s information I to “screen off” the history h and time t where A is 
located, one can drop the indices h and t. This would slightly reduce generality by ruling 
out the possibility that, in different histories or at different times, the same information I 
may lead to different credences, e.g., due to different priors or psychological states of A. 
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3. Objective chance 
When does a history-and-time-indexed probability function Prh,t qualify as an objective 
chance function? Consider a family of such functions, 〈Prh,t〉, with h ranging over the 
histories in Ω and t ranging over the times in T. Schaffer (2007) proposes six desiderata 
that this family must satisfy to play the “objective chance” role.8 These express the idea 
that chance must relate in the right way to various other pertinent concepts, such as 
credence, possibility, the future, intrinsicness, lawfulness, and causation. For present 
purposes, we accept Schaffer’s claim that whichever family of probability functions 
“best” satisfies these desiderata represents objective chance. We call such a family an 
(objective) chance structure on Ω. A lot more could be said about the desiderata than 
space constraints allow us to say here, but since they are the starting point of Schaffer’s 
critique of deterministic chance, they also serve as a useful starting point for us. Adapted 
to our framework,9 the desiderata are as follows: 
                                                
8 Schaffer speaks of a single function with three arguments: a proposition (event), a world 
(history), and a time. Technically, only the projection of this function for a fixed history 
and a fixed time is a probability function; so it is more correct, though equivalent to 
Schaffer’s usage, to speak of a family of history-and-time-indexed probability functions. 
9 Schaffer speaks of each world (history, in our terms) having laws. In our model, laws 
enter in two ways: (i) they impose modal constraints on what histories are nomologically 
possible, determining Ω; (ii) they determine the chance structure. As in Schaffer’s analysis, 
some properties can be attributed to histories only relative to the laws. For instance, 
whether a history is branching depends on the laws encoded in Ω. Similarly, the chance 
of an event E in history h at time t depends on the laws encoded in the chance structure. 
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The chance-credence desideratum: If an agent, in history h at time t, were 
to receive the information that the objective chance of some event E ⊆ Ω is p, 
he or she would assign a degree of belief of p to E, no matter what other 
admissible information he or she has (where this information is formally 
represented by a subset I ⊆ Ω, containing precisely the histories consistent 
with the information).10  
This is a version of Lewis’s “Principal Principle”, which is commonly accepted as a key 
constraint on the role of chance. The second desideratum is equally natural: only events 
that are possible can have non-zero chance. 
The chance-possibility desideratum: A necessary condition for an event 
E ⊆ Ω to have non-zero objective chance in history h at time t is that E is 
possible in h at t, meaning that E contains a continuation of ht. 
This implies further that only contingent events can have non-degenerate chance in 
history h at time t, where an event E is contingent in history h at time t if E and its 
                                                
10 We adopt a permissive definition of “admissible information”, deeming any 
information about the past admissible: I ⊆  Ω is admissible in history h at time t if I 
contains at least all possible continuations of ht. A more restrictive definition would only 
strengthen our (positive) conclusions, by weakening the chance-credence desideratum. 
Since the laws of the system are encoded in Ω (and the chance structure 〈Prh,t〉), the 
admissible information I ⊆  Ω can also convey information about the laws. An agent in a 
deterministic history can thus, in principle, fully predict the future if he or she learns 
which truncated history he or she is in.  
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complement are each possible in h at t. (Note that this is a notion of contingency relative 
to a history and time.) The third, and related, desideratum says that only future events can 
have non-degenerate chance. 
The chance-future desideratum: A necessary condition for an event E ⊆ Ω 
to have non-degenerate objective chance in history h at time t is that E is 
“properly in the future” in h at t. 
Spelling out what it means for an event E to be “properly in the future” in history h at 
time t is a non-trivial task, but for a variety of criteria the chance-future desideratum is a 
consequence of the chance-possibility desideratum. This is easy to see for a simple but 
perhaps unsatisfactory criterion, according to which an event is in the future in history h 
at time t just in case it is contingent in h at t. However, the implication also holds for 
more sophisticated criteria, provided the set of contingent events in history h at time t is a 
subset of the set of future events in h at t.11 The chance-future desideratum could be 
                                                
11 One criterion of the future is the following. Let ST be the set of all functions from T into 
S, i.e., the set of all histories that are logically possible, given the state space S and the set 
of time points T; ST is a superset of Ω. Any event E ⊆ Ω is (non-uniquely) representable 
as E = E* ∩ Ω for some E* ⊆ ST. Heuristically, E* is a (merely) logically possible event, 
while E is the set of all nomologically possible histories in E*. For any time t, let B(t) be 
the set of all times up to and including t, and A(t) the set of all times after t. Let SB(t) be the 
set of all functions from B(t) into S, and SA(t) the set of all functions from A(t) into S. 
Relative to S and T, SB(t) is the set of all logically possible truncated histories up to and 
including time t, and SA(t) the set of logically possible future histories after time t. Then 
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problematic in a relativistic space-time, where the distinction between “past” and “future” 
depends on the reference frame of the observer, but we set this complication aside.   
The fourth desideratum captures the idea that the objective chance of any event is 
determined by relevant properties of the event itself, not by extrinsic or relational 
properties.  
The chance-intrinsicness desideratum: For any histories h, h’, any events 
E, E’ ⊆ Ω, and any times t, t’, if the triple (E, h, t) is an intrinsic duplicate of 
the triple (E’, h’, t’), the objective chance of E in h at t is the same as that of 
E’ in h’ at t’. 
The precise definition of an “intrinsic duplicate” is difficult and raises a number of 
philosophical issues beyond the scope of this paper.12 Informally, if all intrinsic 
                                                                                                                                            
ST=SB(t)×SA(t). An event E is settled in the past of t if E=(P×SA(t))∩Ω for some P ⊆ SB(t); E 
is properly in the future of t if it is not settled in the past of t. (If all histories in Ω are 
deterministic, any event E ⊆ Ω is settled in the past in this sense.) 
12 Schaffer restricts the desideratum to event-world-time triples in which the world is the 
same. In his model (where worlds are endowed with laws), the same laws then apply to 
those triples. Since in our model the laws are encoded in Ω  and the chance structure, the 
same “global” laws apply to any triples. Our formulation of the chance-intrinsicness 
desideratum can be made more or less demanding, depending on our criterion of when 
(E’,h’,t’) and (E,h,t) are intrinsic duplicates. One operationalization involves (i) specifying 
a set Π of permutations (one-to-one, onto functions π) on the state space S such that each 
π in Π induces a permutation π* on ST satisfying π*(Ω)=Ω, and (ii) interpreting the 
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properties of (E, h, t) are exactly replicated in (E’, h’, t’), for instance in two separate runs 
of the same experiment, then the objective chance facts should be the same. 
The fifth desideratum requires that objective chances must be determined by the 
laws of the system, as opposed to, for instance, the attitudes of the observer. 
The chance-lawfulness desideratum: There is a set of laws at the level of Ω 
that determines the chance structure on Ω. 
For example, there are physical laws that imply that a photon has a chance of ½ of 
passing through each of the two symmetrical slits in the classic double-slit experiment. 
The final desideratum, as stated by Schaffer (2007, 126), requires that “if a given 
chance is to explain the transition from cause to effect, that chance must concern some 
event targeted within the time interval from when the cause occurs, to when the effect 
occurs”. However, formalizing this is difficult, and several authors have criticized the 
desideratum as either unclear or implausible (e.g., Glynn 2010, Frigg and Hoefer 2013). 
                                                                                                                                            
elements of Π as transformations of the system’s state that preserve all causally relevant 
features. Different specifications of Π encode different specifications of what those 
features are. Examples of π in Π might be shifting all particles in the universe five metres 
in a specific direction or assigning a unique integer number to every electron and 
exchanging the even- and odd-numbered electrons. Given a specification of Π, we can 
define (E’,h’,t’) to be an intrinsic duplicate of (E,h,t) if there is some permutation π in Π 
such that h’(t’)=π(h(t)) and E’=π*(E). The chance-intrinsicness desideratum then becomes 
the requirement that the permutations in Π be symmetries of the system, where π is a 
symmetry if, for any h in Ω, t in T, and E ⊆ Ω, Prh’,t(π*(E)) = Prh,t(E) with h’ = π*(h). 
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As Glynn notes, moreover, Schaffer’s formulation is not “the obvious candidate for the 
platitude connecting causation and chance”, and a better candidate is the following: 
“causes (tend to) raise the chance of their effects” (Glynn 2010, 76). We therefore replace 
Schaffer’s desideratum with a variant of Glynn’s alternative: 
Chance-causation desideratum: If, in history h at time t, some event C is 
positively causally relevant to another event E, then (except in a case of 
redundant causation) the chance of E, conditional on C, is greater than the 
unconditional chance of E.13 
Note that this desideratum only says that C’s raising the chance of E is a necessary 
condition for C’s positive causal relevance to E (setting aside redundant causation). It 
does not say that C’s raising the chance of E is a sufficient condition for positive causal 
relevance. On most accounts, causation goes beyond a simple probabilistic relationship.14 
                                                
13 One might further require that if C is negatively causally relevant to E, then (except in 
a case of redundancy) the chance of E, given C, is lower than its unconditional chance. 
14 We are greatly indebted to a referee for helping us improve our discussion of the six 
desiderata. For completeness, here is our adaptation of Schaffer’s “causal transition” 
desideratum: if some event C is probabilistically causally relevant to another event E in 
history h at time t, then C must happen after time t and before E. (On the time of an event, 
see footnote 11.) This is a consequence of the chance-future desideratum if we adopt the 
following simple definition: C is probabilistically causally relevant to E in history h at 
time t (before E’s occurrence) if C occurs before E and Prh,t(E|C) ≠ Prh,t(E). The “causal 
transition” desideratum then asserts, in essence, the Markov property of a stochastic 
 13 
If we accept the six desiderata, we obtain the following conclusion, as noted by 
Schaffer (2007). 
Observation 1: There can be no non-degenerate objective chance in a 
deterministic history. 
To see this, let h be a deterministic history, and consider, for example, the chance-
credence desideratum. If an agent were to receive the information that some event E has 
non-degenerate objective chance p in history h at time t, he or she would have to assign a 
degree of belief of p to E, no matter what other admissible information he or she has. 
However, the full information about the truncated history up to time t is certainly 
admissible.15 Formally, this is the subset I of Ω consisting of all possible continuations of 
                                                                                                                                            
process: all “background causes” before time t are encoded in the truncated history ht and 
no longer count as probabilistically causally relevant once time t in history h is reached. 
Four caveats are due. First, the claim that the “causal transition” desideratum is implied 
by the chance-future desideratum holds if we disallow Prh,t(C)=0 (to avoid complications 
raised by conditioning on possible but zero-probability events). Second, we require C to 
occur before E to rule out backwards causal relevance (though this may be contested; see, 
e.g., Price 2008). Third, the probabilistic causal relation depends on a history and time 
because certain background conditions may be necessary for C to become probabilistically 
causally relevant to E; e.g., lighting a match cannot “cause” a fire without flammable 
material nearby. Fourth, probabilistic causal relevance must be distinguished from causal 
relevance simpliciter, since the latter may go beyond the former. See also Pearl (2000). 
15 Proponents of higher-level objective chance typically deny this, deeming only higher-
level information admissible (e.g., Loewer 2001, Hoefer 2007, and Glynn 2010). In Section 
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ht. But h is deterministic, so I is the singleton set containing only h itself. Thus, 
conditional on I, the agent will assign credence 0 or 1 to E, depending on whether E 
contains h or not. This contradicts the chance-credence desideratum, which mandated a 
credence p strictly between 0 and 1. 
Similarly, consider the chance-possibility desideratum. We have already noted that 
it implies that only events that are contingent in history h at time t can have non-
degenerate chance in h at t. But if h is deterministic, no event is contingent in h at t. This 
is because the truncation ht at any time t has only one continuation, namely h itself, and 
thus any event E is possible in h at time t if and only if E contains h itself, in which case 
the complement of E is impossible. So, in a deterministic history, the chance-possibility 
desideratum rules out non-degenerate objective chance. 
Finally, consider the chance-future desideratum. In a deterministic history, all 
events are “settled in the past” (as technically explicated in footnote 11), and thus no 
event counts as being “properly” in the future. This would also follow if we defined an 
event’s being “properly in the future” simply as requiring that it be contingent in the 
relevant history at the relevant time; as we have seen, in a deterministic history, no event 
has this property. Either way, the necessary condition for non-degenerate objective 
chance, according to the chance-future desideratum, cannot be met under determinism. 
                                                                                                                                            
6, we offer a subtly different proposal on how higher-level descriptions can be “insulated” 
from lower-level descriptions. Instead of defining probabilities on a single algebra of 
events and restricting the criterion of admissible information, we move from the original, 
fine-grained algebra to a more coarse-grained, higher-level algebra of events. Relative to 
each level, we can then preserve a permissive criterion of admissible information. 
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(This is not to deny that, in a more richly described ontology of events, some events 
could count as being “in the future” in some other sense, even under determinism.)  
The question of whether, in a deterministic history, the other three desiderata – 
chance-intrinsicness, chance-lawfulness, and chance-causation – can be met by a non-
degenerate chance structure is less straightforward. But in any case, it is clear that our 
package of six desiderata cannot be satisfied in its entirety. By contrast, in indeterministic 
histories, the desiderata pose no such restriction. 
Observation 2: There can be non-degenerate objective chance in an 
indeterministic history. 
To see this, it suffices to consider an example. Take a toy universe containing only one 
particle, whose state is fully described by its location. Space and time in that universe are 
both discrete, and space is one-dimensional. Thus, spatial positions can be represented by 
integers, and points in time by positive integers. In other words, we can write 
S={...,−3,−2,−1,0,1,2,3,...} and T={1,2,3,....}. For the purposes of our example, we 
suppose that the set Ω of nomologically possible histories consists of all histories where 
the particle begins at some spatial position s in S at time t=1, and then moves exactly one 
spatial position (either left or right) in each time period. These histories are non-
deterministic, because any truncated history of length t can be extended in Ω to a 
truncated history of length t+1 in two ways. For example, the truncated history (0,1,2) 
can be extended both to (0,1,2,3) and to (0,1,2,1). We complete the example by supposing 
that the laws of this toy universe, over and above inducing the set Ω, determine the 
following chance structure. 
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For any time t and any spatial position s, let E[s at t] be the set of all histories h in Ω 
such that h(t)=s. Now let h be a specific history in Ω, and suppose h(t)=s. We suppose 
that the laws then specify Prh,t(E[s+1 at t+1]) = ½ and Prh,t(E[s-1 at t+1]) = ½. In other words, the 
particle has an equal chance of moving right or left in each period. The chance function 
Prh,t is given by multiplying these “one-step” chances in the obvious way. To be precise, 
for any positive number n, there are 2n possible extensions of any truncated history ht of 
length t to a truncated history of length t+n, and the chance function Prh,t will assign 
probability 1/2n to each of these possible extensions. There is no barrier for the resulting 
family of chance functions to satisfy all of the six desiderata listed above. This should, of 
course, be uncontroversial. 
4. Epistemic probability 
We have seen that non-degenerate objective chance can exist only in indeterministic 
histories in Ω. This does not mean, however, that non-degenerate probability assignments 
are never appropriate in deterministic histories: they may reflect our uncertain degrees of 
belief, given incomplete information. In fact, whether or not a history is deterministic, an 
agent’s epistemic probability (or credence) function will typically be non-degenerate, 
unless the agent has complete information and there are no chance events in the world.  
For example, after having watched the first half of an old recorded football match, 
we may assign probability 2/3 to our favoured team’s winning – a non-degenerate 
probability assignment – despite understanding that the outcome of the match is long 
settled: we just do not know what it is. This probability assignment simply expresses our 
uncertain degrees of belief; we are even dealing with a past event. On the other hand, we 
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may also hold non-degenerate epistemic probabilities in cases involving real chance. 
Consider our disposition to bet on the outcome of tomorrow’s football match. Ordinarily, 
we think that, over and above the players’ skills, there is some real randomness involved 
here. Generally, therefore, epistemic probabilities (or credences) reflect a mix of 
incomplete information and objective-chance hypotheses. 
Clearly, epistemic probabilities need not, and typically will not, satisfy the six 
desiderata on objective chance. Instead, they must satisfy the following desideratum, 
which ensures compatibility between an agent’s epistemic probabilities (or credences) 
and his information: 
Epistemic probability-possibility desideratum: A necessary condition for 
an event E ⊆ Ω to be assigned non-zero epistemic probability by agent A with 
information I (at time t in history h) is that E is epistemically possible from 
A’s perspective, meaning that E ∩ I is non-empty. 
Furthermore, an agent’s epistemic probabilities may be constrained by the chance-
credence desideratum if they are to respect the agent’s knowledge of chance facts. One 
may or may not wish to impose other desiderata on epistemic probabilities, such as 
Bayesian ones, but we need not take a stand on this here. The key point is that even in the 
limiting case of a completely deterministic history, non-degenerate epistemic probability 
is still possible – and typically entirely rational, given an agent’s incomplete information. 
As long as the information set I is non-singleton, there is no conflict between non-
degeneracy and the epistemic probability-possibility desideratum. The earlier example of 
the pre-recorded football match illustrates this: none of the conceivable outcomes of the 
match is ruled out by our information after watching the first half. 
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The example also motivates a simple criterion for distinguishing “pure” epistemic 
probability from probability assignments that are driven, at least in part, by objective-
chance hypotheses. If we had complete information about the history of football, we 
would already know the outcome of the pre-recorded match before we even watched it: 
there would be no room for non-degenerate epistemic probabilities. However, even with 
complete information about football history, we would still not know the outcome of 
tomorrow’s match. We would continue to entertain non-degenerate epistemic probabilities 
here, which arise from objective-chance considerations.16 (For those who prefer a 
microphysical example: we certainly do not know which of the two slits in the classic 
double-slit experiment a photon will pass through. But even with complete information 
about the past, we would still assign non-degenerate probabilities to the two possibilities, 
since – at least on standard interpretations – we are dealing with objective chance.)   
In general, a sufficient condition for a non-degenerate probability assignment made 
in history h at time t to some event E to be purely epistemic is that it becomes degenerate, 
once we conditionalize on complete information about the truncated history up to time 
t.17 Formally, this yields the following test: 
                                                
16 There is no guarantee, of course, that such full-information epistemic probabilities will 
match the “true” objective chances. The fact that we assign non-degenerate epistemic 
probabilities to the different outcomes here is driven by objective chance; the question of 
which probability values we assign reflects our beliefs about the laws of the system. 
17 Thus an assignment of non-degenerate probability counts as “purely” epistemic if it 
stems from incomplete information alone, rather than any chance considerations. In an 
earlier analysis of epistemic probability, Skyrms (2000, 26) defines the “epistemic 
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Test for pure epistemic probability: Let Pr be a probability function held by 
an agent A in history h at time t, and suppose Pr(E) is non-degenerate for 
some event E. A sufficient condition for Pr to be purely epistemic with respect 
to E is that Pr(E|ht) = 0 or 1. Here, Pr(E|ht) is shorthand for Pr(E|I), where I is 
the information that the truncated history is ht; formally, I = {h’ ∈ Ω : h’ is a 
continuation of ht}.  
5. Emergent indeterminism 
So far, we have described the system of interest at only one level, interpretable as the 
lower level. The state space S can be understood as the set of all possible microphysical 
states, and Ω as the set of all possible microphysical histories. Often, however, we wish 
to employ descriptions at some higher level, for example by describing the state of water 
as liquid or frozen, rather than as a complex configuration of individual molecules, or by 
describing a tossed coin as landing heads or tails, rather than as following a particular 
finely specified physical trajectory. We now focus on some such higher level of 
description, for example the one used in some special science. (Of course, there can be 
many different levels of description; more on this later.) 
                                                                                                                                            
probability of a statement” as the “inductive probability of that argument which has the 
statement … as its conclusion and whose premises consist of … our stock of knowledge”. 
Our test for “pure” epistemic probability is consistent with this, since, on Skyrms’s 
definition, a non-degenerate epistemic probability that is solely due to incomplete 
information also becomes degenerate if we conditionalize on complete information. 
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We assume that (i) higher-level states and histories supervene on lower-level states 
and histories (meaning that there cannot be any variation at the higher level without 
variation at the lower level), and (ii) higher-level states are typically multiply realizable 
by lower-level states. There are many different configurations of water molecules that 
each instantiate the same state of liquid water. Similarly, there are many different 
physical trajectories of a coin that all correspond to landing heads.  
The relationship between the lower and higher levels can be formally captured by 
the idea of coarse-graining: each higher-level state corresponds to an equivalence class 
of lower-level states, consisting of all its possible lower-level realizations. The higher 
level of description thus induces a partition of the lower-level state space S into some set 
of equivalence classes. We call such a partition a coarse-graining of S, and write S to 
denote the set of all equivalence classes under it. Each s in S represents one higher-level 
state, so that we can interpret the set S as the higher-level state space (note the outlined 
letters for higher-level objects).18 Let σ denote the function that maps each lower-level 
state s in S to the corresponding higher-level state s in S (formally, the equivalence class 
to which s belongs). The function σ can also be interpreted as a supervenience relation 
that maps subvenient lower-level states to their supervenient higher-level counterparts.  
                                                
18 The representation of higher-level states as equivalence classes of lower-level states 
(adapted from List 2014) is the simplest mathematical way of capturing the assumption 
that higher-level states supervene on lower-level states and are multiply realizable by 
them. We need not take a stand on whether higher-level states are equivalence classes of 
lower-level states or whether they are merely mathematically represented by such 
equivalence classes. Our analysis is compatible with either interpretation. 
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Next consider histories. Just as a lower-level history is a temporal path through the 
lower-level state space, formally a function h from T into S, so a higher-level history is a 
temporal path through the higher-level state space, formally a function h from T into S. 
For each time t in T, h(t) is the higher-level state of the system at t. Note that the 
supervenience relation σ applies not only to states, but also to histories. For each lower-
level history h in Ω, the corresponding higher-level history h is the function from T into S 
such that, for each t in T, h(t) = σ(h(t)). The set of all possible higher-level histories is the 
projection of the set Ω of all possible lower-level histories under the function σ, formally 
Ω = σ(Ω). Further, just as the set Ω of lower-level histories can be associated with an 
algebra A(Ω) of lower-level events, so the set Ω of higher-level histories can be 
associated with an algebra A(Ω) of higher-level events.19  
With these definitions in place, all the concepts, definitions, and observations from 
the previous sections carry over, without any formal changes, to the system described at 
the higher level, where S is now the state space, Ω the set of possible histories, and A(Ω) 
the algebra of events. All the relevant symbols in those sections must simply be replaced 
by their outlined counterparts.  
For example, we can define determinism and indeterminism in higher-level histories 
in exact analogy to determinism and indeterminism in lower-level histories: a higher-
                                                
19 Formally, we require the function σ to be measurable with respect to A(Ω), meaning 
that the inverse image σ -1(h) (i.e., {h in Ω : σ(h)=h}) is an element of A(Ω) for every h 
in Ω. We can then define A(Ω) = {σ(E) : E is any event in A(Ω)}. 
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level history h is indeterministic (in Ω) if, for some time t, its truncation ht has more than 
one possible continuation in Ω, and deterministic (in Ω) otherwise. A possible continuation 
of ht is defined, as before, as a history h’ in Ω such that h’t = ht. Similarly, a higher-level 
event E ⊆ Ω is possible in history h at time t if E contains a continuation of ht. 
A key point to note is that determinism at the lower level (in Ω) is fully compatible 
with indeterminism at the higher level (in Ω). 
Observation 3: For suitable σ (and sufficiently large Ω), there can be 
indeterministic histories in Ω even when all histories in Ω are deterministic 
(List 2014; for a structurally similar result, see Butterfield 2012). 
Since this observation is – in mathematical terms – a possibility result, it can be proved 
by giving an explicit example of a set Ω of deterministic lower-level histories and a 
coarse-graining function σ for which the resulting set Ω of higher-level histories, where 
Ω=σ(Ω), contains some indeterministic histories. Figure 1 provides such an example. 
Part (a) shows a simple system at the lower level of description (Ω). Time is plotted on 
the horizontal axis (T={1,2,3,...}), and the state of the system on the vertical one. Here 
the state space S is the set of all real numbers. The figure displays five deterministic 
histories, from time t = 1 to time t = 25. Part (b) shows the same system at a higher level 
of description (Ω), obtained by coarse-graining the state space S. Specifically, S is the set 
of all integers. The function σ maps each real number s in S to the closest integer s in S 
(with the usual rounding convention). In this coarse-grained description, there are now 
five indeterministic histories, supervenient on the lower-level deterministic ones. In 
particular, they all coincide up to time t = 9 before diverging from one another. 
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Figure 1: Emergent indeterminism 
6. Objective chance at a higher level  
Observation 3 shows that while a system may be deterministic at a lower level of 
description, indeterminism can emerge at a higher level: while the set Ω may contain 
only deterministic histories, a suitable coarse-graining may yield a set Ω of 
indeterministic histories. But then Observation 2, applied to the level of Ω rather than Ω, 
shows that Ω may admit a non-degenerate objective chance structure. Thus, non-
degenerate objective chance is possible at a higher level of description, even if the system 
is totally deterministic at a lower level of description.  
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Corollary of Observations 2 and 3: There can be non-degenerate objective 
chance in a higher-level history (in Ω), even when all lower-level histories (in 
Ω) are deterministic. (A necessary condition for this is that the higher-level 
history is indeterministic, which is compatible with lower-level determinism.) 
At first sight, this conclusion may seem puzzling. Have we not established that when the 
histories in Ω are deterministic, only degenerate objective chance structures can meet the 
six desiderata? However, the key insight is this: when evaluating chance and 
(in)determinism at a higher level of description, only higher-level language is available. 
The relevant family of history-and-time-indexed probability functions now consists of 
functions defined on the algebra A(Ω) of higher-level events rather than the lower-level 
algebra A(Ω), and the index h now ranges over Ω rather than Ω (while t continues to 
range over T). To make this explicit, we write 〈Prh,t〉 to denote the family of higher-level 
probability functions (on A(Ω), with h ranging over Ω), as distinct from the family 〈Prh,t〉 
of lower-level probability functions (on A(Ω), with h ranging over Ω). Our entire analysis 
from the previous sections, including the desiderata, must then be re-applied at the level 
of Ω rather than Ω.20 
                                                
20 Note that this is subtly different from the approach to higher-level chance in, e.g., 
Loewer (2001), Hoefer (2007), and Glynn (2010), which consists in taking a probability 
function on the original algebra A(Ω) and conditionalizing on higher-level information. 
This still yields probabilities defined on A(Ω), though conditional on higher-level 
information. By contrast, the algebra A(Ω) on which we define higher-level probability 
functions (indexed to histories in Ω) is isomorphic to a sub-algebra of A(Ω). 
 25 
Past arguments for the incompatibility of higher-level objective chance and lower-
level determinism tended to make a conceptual error: they supposed that, when 
evaluating the chance of some higher-level event E ⊆ Ω, we could employ a lower-level 
probability function Prh,t, indexed to a lower-level history h, or conditionalize on a lower-
level event, as in expressions of the form “Prh,t(E) = 0” or “Prh,t(E |E) = 0”. But it should 
now be clear that this is misguided. Such expressions involve a category mistake: they 
mix two different levels of description.21  
The obstacle here is conceptual, not epistemic. There are, of course, a number of 
epistemic questions about whether, and why, we should employ higher-level descriptions 
(lower-level information may or may not be accessible to us, higher-level descriptions 
may or may not be “reducible” to lower-level ones, and so on). We turn to these issues in 
Section 8. However, the conceptual point is that when we are operating at the higher 
level of description, lower-level language is unavailable. The chances of higher-level 
events are given by functions of the form Prh,t, indexed to a higher-level history h and 
defined on the higher-level algebra A(Ω). So, our claim, at this stage of the argument, is 
conditional: if we are operating at the higher level, we must stick to it.  
As further evidence of the pitfalls of mixing levels, note that expressions like 
“Prh,t(E) = 0” or “Prh,t(E |E) = 0” are not even mathematically well-defined when the 
                                                
21 Even Glynn’s (2010) defence of “indeterministic chance”, whose claim about the level-
specificity of chance in response to Schaffer (2007) we agree with, preserves the 
quantification over lower-level histories (worlds) and introduces different levels only via 
level-specific laws, not via explicit coarse-graining of states and histories (worlds) and 
the move to a higher-level algebra.  
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probability function Prh,t is indexed to a higher-level history h and defined on the higher-
level algebra of events A(Ω), while the event E to which a probability is assigned or on 
which the probability is conditionalized is described at the lower level. Technically, 
lower-level events are not in the domain of the probability function Prh,t. 
In Sections 2 and 3, we laid out a theory of objective chance in the setting of 
indeterministic histories in Ω. But this theory applies equally well to Ω: simply replace 
every symbol with its outlined counterpart. As we have seen, when the higher-level 
analysis (in Ω) is correctly insulated from lower-level descriptions (in Ω), higher-level 
indeterminism can coexist with lower-level determinism. So, the possibility of higher-
level non-degenerate objective chance follows immediately from the “outlined letter” 
version of the framework in Sections 2 and 3. 
We now give a simple example of emergent chance (familiar from the dynamical-
systems literature).22 Consider a system whose state space S is the interval of all real 
numbers between 0 and 1. Time is given by the set of positive integers, T={1,2,3,...}. The 
system changes its state from one time period to the next via a transition rule, which is 
formally a function f from S into itself. If s is the state at time t, then f(s) is the state at 
time t+1. Thus, starting at any state s in S, we obtain the following history:  
h(1) = s, h(2) = f(s), h(3) = f( f(s) ), h(4) = f( f( f(s) ) ), and so on.  
The set Ω is the set of all histories that can be obtained in this way. The system is clearly 
deterministic.  
                                                
22 For other, similar examples, see Winnie (1998, 310-314), Suppes (1999), and 
especially Werndl (2009). 
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More specifically, suppose that f is defined as follows (as illustrated in Figure 2): 
   2s if 0 ≤ s ≤ ½;  
f(s) =     {                   
2-2s if ½ < s ≤ 1. 
 
0 1
0.5
1
BA  
Figure 2: The transition rule f 
Now we introduce a coarse-graining of this system. Let A and B be symbols representing 
higher-level states, and let S ={A,B}. Define the function σ from S to S by setting  
 A if 0 ≤ s ≤ ½;  
σ(s) =    {                   
 B if ½ < s ≤ 1. 
  
By implication, σ maps each lower-level history h to a higher-level history h that takes 
the form of a sequence of As and Bs. For example, if we begin in the lower-level state 
s=1/7, we obtain the lower-level history h=(1/7, 2/7, 4/7, 6/7, 2/7, 4/7, ...). After coarse-
graining via σ, this becomes the higher-level history (A,A,B,B,A,B,...). Let Ω be the set of 
all higher-level histories that can be obtained in this way. Then Ω contains every possible 
function from T into {A,B}. Thus, there is not only indeterminism in Ω, but “maximal” 
indeterminism: every truncated history up to time t can be extended to two truncated 
histories up to time t+1, four truncated histories up to time t+2, and so on.  
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Figure 3: Higher-level histories generated by the function f and the partition {A,B} 
To see how a non-degenerate chance structure on Ω arises in a very natural way, 
consider Figure 3. Suppose a higher-level history h begins with A at time t = 1. Then h 
must be the coarsened counterpart of a lower-level history h beginning at some state s 
between 0 and ½. There are two possibilities: either 0 ≤ s ≤ ¼, or ¼ < s ≤ ½. In the first 
case, f(s) (and thus h(2)) must be between 0 and ½, and so h(2) = A. In the second case, 
f(s) (and thus h(2)) must be between ½ and 1, and so h(2) = B. Similarly, if h begins with 
B at time t = 1, its lower-level realizer must begin with some state between ½ and 1. 
Here, either ½ < s < ¾, or ¾ ≤ s ≤ 1. In the first case, h(2) = B; in the second, h(2) = A.  
So, depending on where exactly in the interval S the lower-level state falls at time 
t = 1, we obtain higher-level histories beginning with (A,A), (A,B), (B,B), or (B,A). These 
correspond exactly to four sub-intervals of S, each of length ¼, as shown in Figure 3(a). 
What happens at time t = 3? We must now consider eight sub-intervals of S, each of 
length ⅛, as illustrated in Figure 3(b). Which of these we start in determines the higher-
level history up to time t = 3. For example, if ¼ < s ≤ ⅜, then ½ < f(s) ≤ ¾, and so 
½ < f(f(s)) ≤ 1. Thus σ(s)=A, while σ(f(s))=B and σ(f(f(s)))=B. It follows that h(s) begins 
with (A,B,B). 
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To determine the higher-level history up to time t = 4, we must consider sixteen 
sub-intervals of S, each of length 1/16. These correspond to the sixteen possible truncated 
histories of length 4, as illustrated in Figure 3(c).  
By iterating this argument, we see that, for any time t, the interval S can be 
subdivided into 2t subintervals, each of length 1/2t, which correspond to the 2t possible 
truncated histories of length t in Ω. This symmetry suggests a chance structure for the 
higher-level system, where each of these 2t truncated histories has an equal chance of 
occurring. A higher-level history can then be seen as a sequence of random choices 
between A and B, both having probability ½, and with different choices independent of 
one another, as in a sequence of fair coin tosses. In other words, the higher-level chance 
structure is that of a classic Bernoulli process. There is clearly no barrier for this chance 
structure to satisfy the six desiderata on objective chance.23  
One might object that the emergence of non-degenerate objective chance in this 
example is an artifact of the excessively coarse partition of S into only two sub-intervals, 
from 0 to ½ and from ½ to 1, which we labelled A and B. But non-degenerate objective 
chance also emerges from finer partitions. Suppose, for example, we partition S into four 
                                                
23 The set Ω of higher-level histories as formally defined here admits many other non-
degenerate chance structures. The one we describe has some claim to being the most 
“natural” one, as it is invariant under an exchange of the symbols A and B; it can thus be 
motivated by some reasonable assumptions about the symmetries of the system. But it is 
not necessary for our purposes to show that this chance structure is in any way unique or 
canonical. What matters is that it is consistent with the six desiderata (at the level of Ω). 
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sub-intervals of length 1/4 each, labelled {AA,AB,BB,BA}, as in Figure 3(a). Then an 
argument similar to the one just given shows that, for any higher-level history h (now a 
function from T into S = {AA,AB,BB,BA}), if h(t) = AA (for example), we must have 
Prh,t[h(t+1)=AA] = ½ and Prh,t[h(t+1)=AB] = ½. Similar points apply if h(t) is AB, BB, or 
BA. If, instead, we partition S into eight sub-intervals of length 1/8 each, labelled 
{AAA,AAB,ABB,ABA,BAA,BAB,BBB,BBA}, as in Figure 3(b), then non-degenerate 
chance emerges again: for any higher-level history h (now over an even finer S), if 
h(t) = BBB (for example), we have Prh,t[h(t+1)=BBA] = ½ and Prh,t[h(t+1)=BBB] = ½. 
Indeed, a non-degenerate chance structure emerges for any finite partition of the 
interval S.24 The reason is that lower-level histories of the system are extremely sensitive 
to small perturbations. To see this, suppose that s and s’ are two points in the interval S, 
which generate lower-level histories h and h’, corresponding to higher-level histories h 
and h’ via some coarse-graining function σ. Suppose s and s’ are very close together. The 
distance between f(s) and f(s’) will then typically be twice the distance between s and s’.25 
And the distance between f(f(s)) and f(f(s’)) will typically be twice that between f(s) and 
f(s’) (hence four times the distance between s and s’),26 and so on. In this way, the lower-
level histories h and h’ will rapidly diverge from each other. This, in turn, will lead the 
corresponding higher-level histories h and h’ to come apart eventually. Even if two 
higher-level histories h and h’ agree for their first two million entries, there is no reason 
for h(2,000,001) to be the same as h’(2,000,001).  
                                                
24 See Werndl (2009, Section 4.2) for similar observations. 
25 This is true as long as s and s’ are both in sub-interval A, or both in sub-interval B. 
26 This is true as long as f(s) and f(s’) are both in sub-interval A, or both in sub-interval B. 
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7. The objective-epistemic distinction at every level 
In Section 4, we drew the distinction between objective chance and epistemic probability 
at the lower level of description (i.e., in Ω). However, the same distinction can be drawn 
at the higher level (in Ω) and, indeed, at every level of description. Objective chance at 
any level is represented by whichever family of history-and-time-indexed probability 
functions “best” satisfies the six desiderata at that level. An epistemic probability 
function is only required to satisfy the epistemic probability-possibility desideratum at the 
relevant level and – if it is also constrained by level-specific chance information – the 
chance-credence desideratum. While an objective chance function can be non-degenerate 
only if there is indeterminism at the level at which the function is defined, an epistemic 
probability function can be non-degenerate even if there is determinism at that level.  
Importantly, our earlier operational test for pure epistemic probability applies at 
each level. A non-degenerate probability assignment at a given level meets the sufficient 
condition for being purely epistemic – not driven by any chance hypotheses – if it 
becomes degenerate once we conditionalize on complete information about the truncated 
history at that level.  
Test for pure epistemic probability, where Ω  is the level-specific set of 
histories: Let Pr be a probability function held by an agent A in history 
h∈Ω  at time t, with Pr defined on A(Ω), and suppose Pr(E) is non-
degenerate for some event E ⊆  Ω . A sufficient condition for Pr to be purely 
epistemic with respect to E is that Pr(E |h t) = 0 or 1. As before, Pr(E |ht) 
stands for Pr(E |I), where I is the information that the truncated history is ht; 
formally I = {h’ ∈ Ω : h’ is a continuation of ht}. 
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Consider the example of two dice being thrown onto a gaming table. Perhaps the system 
of tumbling dice admits a microphysical description Ω that is completely deterministic. 
However, as explained in Section 6, the system may also admit a higher-level description 
Ω in which the objective chance that the gambler is about to throw snake-eyes (a pair of 
ones) is 1/36. Now suppose the gambler has already thrown the dice, but the result is 
hidden from your view by a barrier. The gambler can see the dice, but you cannot. There 
is no longer any non-degenerate objective chance here; either the dice came up snake-
eyes, or they did not. The objective chance of this event is now either zero or one. But 
from your perspective, with limited information, the epistemic probability of the event 
(your credence) remains 1/36. Once the barrier is removed, however, you will assign 
probability 0 or 1. In this story, there is both objective chance (about how the dice will 
land in the future) and epistemic probability (about how the dice have already landed). 
For another example, consider the sort of uncertainty confronted by meteorologists. 
Perhaps the Earth’s atmosphere admits a microphysical description Ω that is completely 
deterministic. However, this system also admits a higher-level description Ω, in which the 
objective chances of future weather events are non-degenerate. Meteorologists gather 
data from a large array of weather sensors (thermometers, hygrometers, barometers, etc.) 
and analyze it with computers to predict tomorrow’s weather. These predictions are 
uncertain, and this uncertainty arises in part from the existence of non-degenerate objective 
chance about tomorrow’s weather at the level of Ω. Indeed, meteorologists model the 
weather as a stochastic system. However, meteorologists also confront another kind of 
uncertainty. Their network of sensors is sparse. The current meteorological conditions at 
some location X between two sensors are unknown. But the meteorologists can assign a 
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probability distribution to the current conditions at X. This is a purely epistemic 
probability; if there had been a sensor at X, the epistemic probability for the conditions at 
X would be degenerate, because the meteorologists would know the actual conditions at X.  
Finally, consider an example from the social world. The police in a big city wish to 
forecast crime rates in various neighbourhoods, in order to organize effective patrols. 
Whether or not there is some physical or neuropsychological level (Ω) at which each 
individual crime is pre-determined, at the ordinary human or social level (Ω) the police 
will have to treat patterns of crime as involving non-degenerate objective chance. The 
chance of various crimes happening will differ from neighbourhood to neighbourhood: 
there is a higher chance of petty theft and pickpocketing at the railway station than on a 
quiet residential street. The probabilities in question would not become degenerate even if 
the police had complete information about the human and social history up to now. 
Contrast this with a murder investigation in which the police assign probability 1/3 to the 
hypothesis that Jones did it. This probability is purely epistemic. Conditional on complete 
historical information (at the level of Ω), it would collapse into 0 or 1, since the relevant 
history would settle the matter. 
Our claim that there is a well-defined distinction between objective chance and 
epistemic probability at every level of description, and that non-degenerate objective 
chance can be a level-specific phenomenon, does not depend on our reasons for employing 
descriptions at different levels. In particular, the question of why we should describe a 
system at a particular level – say a higher level – is distinct from the question of whether, 
at that level, the system admits non-degenerate objective chance. Recall that, once we are 
describing a system at a given level, the level-specific chance facts are represented by 
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whichever family of history-and-time-indexed probability functions best satisfies the six 
desiderata at that level. What makes them objective chance functions, relative to that 
level, is simply the satisfaction of the six desiderata. Their status as level-specific objective 
chance functions does not depend on any claims about the “objectivity” of the level itself, 
and indeed we make no such claims. Keep in mind that the identified functions are not 
interpreted as representing “objective chance simpliciter”, independently of the level of 
description. They represent objective chance relative to that level. 
On the present picture, one could consistently hold that (i) higher-level descriptions 
are needed because of our informational (or, more broadly, cognitive) limitations, and yet 
that (ii) relative to the higher level, there can be non-degenerate objective chance as 
distinct from epistemic probability. It is a consequence of what we have argued that, even 
if our reasons for employing higher-level descriptions were entirely epistemic, this would 
not undermine the distinction between objective chance and epistemic probability relative 
to that level; that distinction is drawn solely on the basis of level-specific criteria.27 
                                                
27 Our point that there can be objective chance relative to a given level of description, 
independently of our reasons for employing descriptions at that level, is reminiscent of a 
point that Cohen and Callender (2009) make about (in our terminology) level-relative 
laws. They argue that relativizing laws to levels “does not entail subjectivity in the sense 
of making scientists (or others) invulnerable to errors about the laws” (ibid., 30). The 
reason is that there are observer-independent facts about which generalizations satisfy the 
appropriate level-relative criteria for lawhood (ibid.). Similarly, we suggest that the 
question of whether a given family of history-and-time-indexed probability functions 
satisfies the desiderata for objective chance at a particular level does not depend on the 
observer or on why he or she is interested in that level. 
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8. The reasons for employing higher-level descriptions 
Although the well-definedness of the distinction between higher-level chance and higher-
level epistemic probability does not depend on our reasons for employing higher-level 
descriptions, its interest-value does. If higher-level descriptions could easily be dispensed 
with, then the claim that there can be non-degenerate objective chance, relative to the 
higher level, would be, at most, an idle theoretical curiosity. However, if higher-level 
descriptions are indispensable in practice, then higher-level chance is a phenomenon of 
theoretical as well as practical interest. In what follows, we briefly review some of the 
reasons for employing higher-level descriptions and suggest that, in the case of many 
systems, such descriptions may actually be indispensable. Of course, a full defence of this 
claim – familiar from many discussions of the special sciences – is beyond the scope of 
this paper. But it is also not required for the theory of higher-level chance we have 
developed. The point of this section is merely to summarize, in broad outline, why 
higher-level descriptions are needed in many contexts. We have already presented the 
case for the possibility of level-specific chance itself. 
The simplest reason for using higher-level descriptions is that we often lack, and 
cannot acquire, complete information about the lower-level state of a system. We have 
seen that, even if this were the only reason for using higher-level descriptions, it would 
still not undermine the distinction between objective chance and epistemic probability, 
relative to the higher level. However, incomplete information about a system’s lower-
level state is not the only reason for using higher-level descriptions. Arguably, whether or 
not we could acquire complete information about the lower-level state, higher-level 
descriptions are often necessary for agents such as ourselves to avoid the unmanageable 
complexity of the lower level.  
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First, the lower-level dynamics of many systems are chaotic. Very small errors in 
our measurement of the current state of a system can lead to very large errors in our 
predictions of the system’s future behaviour. (A simple example is the system shown in 
Figures 2 and 3 in Section 6.) Since some tiny amount of measurement error is inevitable 
in practice, prediction may not generally be feasible at the lower level. By contrast, under 
a suitable coarse-graining, the chaotically diverging trajectories at the lower level can 
perhaps be amalgamated into a single, predictable trajectory at some higher level – or at 
least, into a higher-level stochastic process with a manageable amount of randomness; 
weather forecasting is an example.  
Second, even if we could make perfect measurements, or even if the lower-level 
dynamics were not chaotic, lower-level predictions might still be uneconomical or 
unparsimonious due to computational complexity, and often not what we are ultimately 
interested in. For example, imagine that we pour a few drops of blue dye into one part of 
a water tank, undisturbed by any movement. How will the dye diffuse? If viewed through 
a microscope, each of the trillions of jostling, jiggling blue dye particles would exhibit 
Brownian motion, and wander along some convoluted, labyrinthine path through the 
tank, which, in turn, is the result of a deterministic kinetic-molecular process. All this is 
extremely hard to model.28 At a macroscopic level, however, the system admits a very 
                                                
28 Note further that the apparent “randomness” of each dye particle’s Brownian motion 
(though not our focus here) is arguably yet another instance of emergent chance: it is due 
to the way each dye particle is constantly buffeted by millions of much smaller and faster 
water molecules. At the microscope’s level of resolution, a dye particle’s motion is best 
described by an elegant probabilistic model called the Wiener process. But it supervenes 
on the deterministic dynamics of the underlying, more fine-grained molecular collisions.   
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simple and informative description: if we write down a function describing the three-
dimensional density distribution of the dye in the water at time zero, then this function 
evolves predictably under a partial differential equation called the heat equation, which is 
often amenable to a relatively easy computational solution at all future times.29 Similarly, 
to give a more informal example, the dynamics of trillions of molecules of water and 
other organic compounds ricocheting around a tea cup are hard to model at a 
microphysical level, while what we are ultimately interested in is how long it takes for 
the tea to brew or how strong it is, for which we have simple rules of thumb. The 
examples illustrate that it is often more economical, parsimonious, and informative to use 
a coarse-grained model, perhaps a statistical one, at a higher level of description.30  
Third, in many systems, there are robust regularities among higher-level properties. 
We have just mentioned two such regularities, in the heat equation governing diffusion 
processes and in the familiar rules of thumb telling us how long it takes for a tea to brew. 
Further, proponents of “higher-level causation” defend the view that the causes of higher-
level effects are sometimes other higher-level properties, and not always the token 
realizers at the lower level (see, e.g., the contributions in Ellis, Noble, and O’Connor 
2012). This view is particularly plausible when (as common in the special sciences) 
                                                
29 For instance, if the concentration at time zero is a multivariate standard normal 
distribution with variance σ2, then the concentration at time t will be a multivariate 
standard normal distribution with variance Ct + σ2, where C is a constant describing the 
diffusion speed, determined by the water temperature, the mass of the dye particles, etc. 
30 The case for using higher-level statistical models is frequently made in the literature on 
deterministic chance (e.g., Loewer 2001, Frigg and Hoefer 2010, Albert 2012). 
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causation is understood as difference-making (List and Menzies 2009, Raatikainen 2010). 
The difference-making cause of an agent’s action, for example, may be, not her brain 
state, microphysically described, but her mental state, described at a higher level. 
Similarly, the difference-making cause of an increase in inflation may be a set of actions 
of the central bank and the government, together with other macro-economic properties, 
all described at a higher level, rather than their token realizers at the individual level, let 
alone at the microphysical one (e.g., Sawyer 2003, List and Spiekermann 2013). If these 
claims are correct, then higher-level descriptions sometimes yield better causal 
explanations than lower-level ones. Indeed, the special sciences have taught us that, for 
many phenomena, the most explanatorily illuminating level of description is not a 
microphysical one, but a chemical, biological, psychological, or social one.31 
Furthermore, although we are often interested in higher-level information – both in 
ordinary life and in the special sciences – recovering this information from a complete 
lower-level description of a system is sometimes not merely uneconomical, but not 
possible at all, given our cognitive limitations. The “coarse-graining” map σ may be a 
well-defined mathematical object, but there is no reason to assume that it admits a simple 
(or even just finite) description in any formal language available to us. Via σ, each 
higher-level history h corresponds to an equivalence class H of lower-level histories. 
                                                
31 For a related discussion, see Callender and Cohen (2010), who argue that “although all 
events supervene on a fundamental level, there is no one unique locus of projectibility; 
rather there are a large number of loci corresponding to the different areas (ecology, 
economics, solid-state chemistry, etc.) in which there are simple and strong 
generalizations to be made” (ibid., 427). 
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Unfortunately, the simplest description of H may be just an enumeration of its elements. 
If H contains infinitely many elements, it may not even be describable by any finite 
sentence. This is not an outlandish possibility; there is a sense in which, if Ω is itself 
infinite, “almost all” subsets of Ω admit no finite description.32 And even if H is finitely 
describable, the shortest description of H could be astronomically large: it may contain as 
many symbols as there are atoms in the Milky Way galaxy.  
Finally, and more speculatively, even if the description of H is finite and of 
manageable length, it is still possible that it is formally undecidable33 or computationally 
                                                
32 The class of all subsets of Ω that admit a finite description is countable. But the class 
of all subsets of Ω is uncountable. So the former is a very small subclass of the latter. 
33 This means there is no algorithm which, given a precise specification of the low-level 
history h, will always correctly determine whether h is in H, after a finite computational 
process. Many apparently “simple” questions of the form “Is object a of type B?” are 
formally undecidable. For example: Given an initial point in an orbit of a dynamical 
system, will this orbit enter a certain region of the state space? Given an arbitrary finite 
collection of polygonal tiles, can we tile the Euclidean plane with non-overlapping copies 
of them? Given a geometric object obtained by gluing together polygons, polyhedrons, 
and their higher-dimensional counterparts (a simplicial complex), does this object have a 
hole in it like a donut? (Is it simply connected?) The claim is not that no problems of 
these types can be solved. For many special cases, there are solutions. The claim is that 
there is no general algorithm for all problems of these types. For an introduction to 
formal undecidability and other examples, see Moore and Mertens (2011, Ch. 7). 
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intractable34 whether any particular lower-level history belongs to H or not. If this is the 
case, then some questions about a system’s higher-level history cannot be answered on 
the basis of a lower-level description of the system alone, even a complete description.35 
Instead, we may need to use higher-level descriptions as “primitives”. 
In sum, there are both practical and theoretical reasons why higher-level 
descriptions are often indispensable. As should be evident, the present arguments are in 
line with familiar arguments against the reducibility of higher-level properties to lower-
level ones (among other things, due to multiple realizability, as argued, e.g., in Fodor 
1974 and Putnam 1975), and for non-reductive physicalism in the special sciences (e.g., 
                                                
34 Informally, this means that, although there is an algorithm to determine whether h is in 
H, it may take trillions of years for it to produce an answer. Thus it is unknowable, in 
practice, whether h is in H. The best-known (but not the only) formal notion of 
computational intractability is NP-completeness. Many apparently “simple” problems are 
NP-complete. For example: Given an arbitrary expression in propositional logic, can we 
assign truth-values to the propositional letters to make it true? Given a finite set of points 
{p,q,r,s,t,...} in Euclidean space, is p a weighted average of q, r, s, t, ... ? Given a list of 
numbers, can we split it into two sub-lists that add up to the same value? Given an 
arbitrary network of vertices and links, is there a path that goes through every vertex 
exactly once? NP-complete problems are only the bottom of an infinite hierarchy of 
increasingly intractable (but decidable) problems. See Moore and Mertens (2011, Ch. 5-6). 
35 By contrast, given the solution to one formally undecidable problem, we can solve any 
other formally undecidable problem at the same level of the relevant hierarchy; given the 
solution to one NP-complete problem, we can solve any other NP-hard problem relatively 
easily, via a “polynomial-time reduction” (Moore and Mertens 2011, Sect. 7.2.4 and 5.1).  
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Jackson and Pettit 1990, Pereboom 2002, List and Menzies 2009). Non-reductive 
physicalism is the view that higher-level properties (i) supervene on lower-level 
properties, (ii) are non-identical to them (and admit no type reduction), and (iii) play a 
causal role in the world. Our case for the need to employ higher-level descriptions can be 
regarded as an instance of the case for non-reductive physicalism more generally. 
9. An objection 
We have seen that different levels of description of a system correspond to different 
algebras of events on which probabilities are defined, and that the distinction between 
objective chance and epistemic probability can be drawn at every level. A necessary 
condition for the occurrence of non-degenerate chance at a given level is indeterminism 
at that level. Since higher-level indeterminism is consistent with lower-level 
determinism, the latter does not rule out non-degenerate chance at a higher level.  
A critic might still object that, when there is lower-level determinism, such higher-
level chance is not “true” objective chance. “True” objective chance, the critic might say, 
requires indeterminism at the lowest or most fundamental level of description. This is 
what Schaffer (2007) seems to suggest. So formulated, the objection makes the 
assumption that there is a lowest or most fundamental level, which can be challenged.36 
But there is a second version of the objection, which does not make this assumption. It 
asserts that if there is some level at which the system is deterministic, then any non-
                                                
36 For example, in an earlier article, Schaffer (2003) argues that there is “no evidence” in 
support of that assumption (ibid., 498) and that there could plausibly be “an infinite 
descending hierarchy of levels” without any bottom (ibid., 499). In subsequent work, 
however, Schaffer implies that there is a fundamental level (see especially 2010, 37). 
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degenerate probability at a higher level can only be epistemic. Or relatedly: if there is 
non-degenerate objective chance at a higher level, then all lower levels must also admit 
non-degenerate objective chance.37 What can be said in response to this objection? 
First, the objection, in both versions, overlooks the level-specific nature of the 
distinction between objective chance and epistemic probability. On the picture we have 
defended, the hallmark of an objective chance structure at a particular level is the 
satisfaction of the six desiderata at that level, not any facts about other levels. As our 
formal results have shown, non-degenerate objective chance, understood in this level-
specific way, requires indeterminism at the same level, not at others. 
Second, in the absence of indeterminism “all the way down”, the critic endorsing 
the objection is compelled to lump all higher-level probability together into an 
“epistemic” (as opposed to “objective”) category. More precisely, the critic is committed 
to the view that if there is determinism at either the fundamental level (for the first 
version of the objection) or some level below the level of interest (for the second), then 
any higher-level probability can only be epistemic. Objective chance at the higher level 
would have to be accompanied by indeterminism at the lower level. For example, if a 
system of tumbling dice has deterministic microphysical foundations, the critic loses the 
ability to distinguish between the chance of the dice coming up snake-eyes in the next 
round (a future event that is “random” from a higher-level perspective) and our credence 
in the hypothesis that, in the last round, the outcome was snake-eyes (a past event that is 
already settled, but which we have not yet observed). The second of these probabilities 
would become degenerate if we received complete information about the truncated 
                                                
37 We are grateful to the editors for helping us sharpen this objection. 
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higher-level history up to now. The first probability would not. Indeed, it would satisfy 
the desiderata for playing the “chance role” at the higher level. Our distinction between 
higher-level chance and higher-level epistemic probability captures this point naturally. 
The critic is unable to make the distinction. 
10. The mutual embeddability of deterministic and indeterministic systems 
Two final results should give further pause to those who think that we can draw a single 
distinction between objective chance and epistemic probability simpliciter, or between 
indeterminism and determinism simpliciter, instead of drawing a family of level-specific 
such distinctions.   
Observation 4: Any deterministic system can be expressed as emerging from 
a more fine-grained indeterministic system.   
Observation 5: Any indeterministic system can be expressed as emerging 
from a more fine-grained deterministic system.  
Observation 4 shows that, no matter how fine-grained the level is at which a given system 
displays determinism, we can never rule out the possibility of indeterminism at an even 
lower level. Similarly, Observation 5 shows that, no matter how fine-grained the level is 
at which a given system displays indeterminism (and admits non-degenerate chance), we 
can never rule out the possibility of determinism at an even lower level.38   
To prove Observation 4, let T be any set of times, S any state space, and Ω any set 
of deterministic histories (i.e., functions from T into S). Now let S = S × {0,1}. In other 
                                                
38 See Winnie (1998, 305-306) and Werndl (2009, Section 3.2) for results similar to 
Observation 5. See also Suppes (1993, 250-252 and 254) for an earlier discussion.  
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words, S is the set of all ordered pairs of the form (s, b), where s is an element of S, and b 
is either 0 or 1. Any S-valued history (i.e., any function h from T into S) is thus a 
combination of two functions: a function h from T into S, and a function β from T into 
{0,1}. Let Ω be the set of all histories (h, β), where h is any element of Ω, and β is any 
possible function from T into {0,1}. It is clear that Ω is a set of indeterministic histories; 
any length-t truncated history (ht, βt) in Ω has two possible extensions to a truncated 
history of length t+1: one where β(t+1)=0, and one where β(t+1)=1. Now we define the 
function σ from S to S by setting σ(s, b) = s for any s in S and b in {0,1}. Then σ is a 
coarse-graining map that converts the (indeterministic) histories of Ω into the 
(deterministic) histories of Ω. 
To prove Observation 5, let T be any set of times, S any state space, and Ω any set 
of indeterministic histories (i.e., functions from T into S). Now define S =  Ω × T. In 
other words, S is the set of all ordered pairs of the form (h, t), where h is any element of 
Ω, and t is some point in time. For any history h in Ω, we define a function h from T into 
S by setting h(t) = (h, t), for all t in T. Clearly, this is a completely deterministic history. 
(Heuristically, the lower-level world consists of a “book” and a “clock”. The “book” is a 
complete record of the entire history of the higher-level world, both past and future. It is 
represented by h, and it never changes. The “clock” is represented by the t-coordinate, 
which simply records the current time, and thus evolves in an entirely predictable way.) 
Let Ω be the set of all lower-level histories obtained in this way; then Ω is a deterministic 
system. Finally, we define a function σ from S to S by setting σ(h, t) = h(t), for any h in 
Ω and t in T. Then σ is a coarse-graining map that converts the (deterministic) histories 
of Ω into the (indeterministic) histories of Ω. 
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Of course, these are purely mathematical constructions, which only provide a proof 
of possibility. We do not claim that the lower level of any physical system would have 
the structure described in the previous two paragraphs. In reality, the lower level would 
presumably be some system of interacting particles and fields, of the kind described in 
modern microphysical theories. But these examples illustrate that there is no necessary 
entailment from indeterminism at a higher level to indeterminism at a lower level, or vice 
versa. Similarly, there is no reason to assume that when a system admits a non-degenerate 
chance structure at a higher level, it must also admit a non-degenerate chance structure at 
a lower level, or vice versa.  
Furthermore, the present constructions can be iterated indefinitely; it is perfectly 
possible to have a deterministic higher-level system that is a coarse-graining of an 
indeterministic lower-level system, which is in turn a coarse-graining of an even lower-
level deterministic system, and so on. There could be an infinite hierarchy of such 
systems, with no “rock bottom” level; it could be “turtles all the way down”.39  
                                                
39 As mentioned above, Schaffer (2003) argues that an infinite hierarchy of levels without 
any bottom is a coherent possibility, though he does not examine the question of 
determinism in such a setting. It is worth noting that the metaphysical picture in 
Schaffer’s 2003 article supports the reality of higher-level properties. He criticizes the 
“ontological attitude according to which the entities [for our purposes: properties] of the 
fundamental level are primarily real, while any remaining contingent entities [properties] 
are at best derivative, if real at all” (ibid., 498). He suggests that if we drop the 
assumption of a fundamental level while retaining “a hierarchical picture of nature as 
stratified into levels” (a picture he takes to be “reflected in the structure and discoveries 
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Observation 6: An infinite hierarchy of levels, forever alternating between 
deterministic and indeterministic sets of level-specific histories, is a coherent 
(and unfalsifiable) possibility.40   
In this scenario, it would make no sense to ask whether the system was deterministic or 
indeterministic “simpliciter”. There would be no level-independent answer to this question. 
11. Conclusion 
Objective chance, along with indeterminism, should be understood as a level-specific 
phenomenon, which stands in no conflict with determinism at other levels, both lower 
and higher.41 Objective chance is only incompatible with determinism at the same level. 
There is not a single distinction between objective chance and epistemic probability, but a 
separate distinction for each level. 
                                                                                                                                            
of the sciences”), we arrive at “a far more palatable metaphysic in which … all entities 
[for us: properties] are equally real” (ibid.). 
40 Mathematically, this can be obtained through an inverse limit construction. 
41 Throughout this paper, our use of the conventional terminology of “levels” of 
description should not be taken to imply that there must generally exist a linearly ordered 
hierarchy of levels. Our approach of representing different levels of description in terms 
of different algebras of events, related to one another via coarse-graining, permits the 
existence of an entire lattice of “levels”, partially ordered by the coarse-graining relation.  
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